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ADVERSE POSSESSION OF 
THE SEVERED MINERAL 
ESTATE IN ARKANSAS
Professor Phillip E. Norvell
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND THE SEVERED MINERAL ESTATE IN ARKANSAS
by
Professor Phillip E. Norvell 
University o f Arkansas School o f Law (Fayetteville)
“There is something about property law that makes it go crazy when it gets underground. ” 
CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 63 (1961).
I. Adverse Possession of Mineral Interests by Surface Occupancy
A. Adverse possession by surface occupancy acquires title to subsurface minerals if 
the minerals have not been severed from the fee prior to the claimant’s surface 
entry. Stewart v. Pelt. 131 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1939).
1. The rationale for the result.
“Cujus et solu, ergo est usque ad coelum et ad infernos,” is the venerable 
Latin phrase that has historically been used to refer to the common law’s 
Ad coelum theory o f land ownership. The doctrine holds that the owner of 
the fee owns the subsurface o f the land. The phrase is roughly translated as 
“To whom ever owns the soil, he owns also to the sky and to the depths.” 
See, e. g., Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & 
Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55 (1898).
2. The Texas statement o f the rule.
“The general rule is that if there is no severance o f mineral rights from the 
surface, an adverse entry upon the surface extends downward and draws to 
it a title to the underlying minerals.” Broughton v. Humble Oil and Ref 
Co., 105 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937).
B. Adverse possession by surface occupancy does not obtain title to previously 
severed minerals. Bodcaw Lumber. Co. v. Goode. 254 S.W. 345 (Ark. 1923).
1. The rationale for the result.
“ The statute o f limitations does not run against these rights (severed 
mineral interests) unless there is an actual adverse holding which
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constitutes an invasion of these rights.” Id. at 348.
2. Understanding the severed versus non-severed mineral distinction.
When only a fractional share o f the mineral ownership has been severed 
from the original fee title, the non-severed minerals are acquired by adverse 
possession of the surface estate. See, e.g., Wright v. Buckner. 236 S.W.2d 
720 (Ark. 1951).
See also Fadem v.Kimball. 612 P.2d 287, 292 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979), 
wherein the Court states: “We think it is clear that a conveyance or 
reservation of a fractional interest in the minerals by the owner o f a fee 
simple estate will only effect a severance o f the fractional interest so 
conveyed or reserved.”
C. The severance of the mineral estate from the fee.
1. Mineral deeds, reservations in deeds, or devises in wills.
Minerals are severed by an operative conveyance, testamentary disposition, 
or judicial decree that separates the ownership o f the surface and the 
minerals. 1 Eugene Kuntz, Oil and Gas § 10.4. (W.H. Anderson Co.
1962).
2. The participation in an off-tract unit well.
Participation in a unit well that was located off-tract, not situated on the 
tract in issue, did not cause a severance o f the mineral estate from the fee. 
Krosmico v. Pettit. 968 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1998).
3. The execution o f an oil and gas lease.
a. The Texas cases.
i. Courts in Texas hold that the execution o f an oil and gas 
lease severs the oil and gas from the fee. Weems v. 
Hawkins. 278 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
What is the effect o f adverse possession o f the surface after 
the execution o f an oil and gas lease in Texas? “Logically, 
adverse possession should run as to rights retained by the 
lessor, both under the existing lease, as to royalties for 
example, and as to the reversionary interest which would
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divest the lessee o f all title upon expiration o f the lease. 
Discussion Notes, 1 O.&G.R. 447 at 450.
b. The Oklahoma cases.
Courts in Oklahoma hold that the execution o f an oil and gas lease 
does not sever the oil and gas from the fee. Krosmico v. Pettit.
968 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1998).
c. Distinguishing the Texas and Oklahoma cases.
Texas, following the “ownership in place” theory, holds that the 
landowner’s interest in subsurface oil and gas is a corporeal 
interest. Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co.. 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948). 
Oklahoma, following the “exclusive right to take theory,” known as 
the “nonownership” theory, holds that the landowner’s interest in 
subsurface oil and gas is an incorporeal interest. Rich v .
Doneehev. 177 P. 86 (Okla. 1918). Is this an illusory distinction? 
Arkansas is typically cited as following the corporeal interest 
theory as to the landowner’s interest in oil and gas. See, e.g., 
Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode. 254 S.W. 345 (Ark. 1923). 
However, Arkansas follows the incorporeal interest theory, the 
exclusive right to take theory, as to the lessee’s interest in the oil 
and gas lease. Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander. 133 S.W. 839 
(Ark. 1911).
4. The doctrine o f merger.
a. The definition o f merger.
“The term merger means that, where a lesser and a greater estate in 
the same land come together and vest, without any intermediate 
estate, in the same person and in the same right, the lesser is 
immediately annihilated by operation o f law. It is said to be 
“merged, i.e., sunk or drowned, in the greater estate”. G.C. 
Cheshire, The Modem Law of Real Property 831 (Butterworths 
10th ed. 1967).
See also Bingham v. Rhea. 143 S.W.2d 1087, 1088 (1940).
b. The merger issue arises when the ownership of the severed 
mineral estate and the surface estate are subsequently reunited. If 
the merger doctrine is applied, the severed mineral estate is merged
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with the fee and, thereafter, for adverse possession purposes, is 
treated as a non-severed mineral interest.
I find no case in point from any jurisdiction but two cases are 
worthy of note.
i. Merger is a matter o f intent.
The merger o f a previously severed mineral interest with a 
subsquently acquired surface estate is a matter o f intent. 
Ferguson v. Hilborn, 402 P.2d 914 (Okla. 1965).
ii. Merger occurs as a matter o f law.
Jones v. McFaddin. 382 S.W. 2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) 
held that the sovereign’s title to mines and minerals, derived 
from the Civil Law of Spain that prevailed in Texas prior to 
1835, was merged into the private landowner’s fee title by 
the Constitutional Release of 1866 in which the State of 
Texas, by a constitutional provision, relinquished its mineral 
title to landowners. The argument that fee simple absolute 
estates, being estates of equal dignity, were not merged at 
the common law was rejected in the case. McFaddin dealt 
with a surface owner’s acquisition o f the severed mineral 
interest by virtue o f a State Constitutional provision and 
offers little support to the applicability o f the merger 
doctrine to private conveyancing.
D. The horrors o f the unrecorded mineral severance.
1. The adverse possessor and the unrecorded mineral reservation.
An unrecorded mineral deed is valid against a subsequent bona fide 
purchaser who acquires title by adverse possession that is based on surface 
occupancy that began after the execution o f the unrecorded mineral deed. 
Taylor v . Scott. 685 S.W.2d 160 (Ark. 1985).
Taylor v. Scott establishes that the severance of the mineral estate for 
purposes of determining the interests acquired by the adverse possessor 
occurs when the mineral deed is executed, not recorded. As a 
consequence, any break in the record chain-of-title raises the possibility 
that an unrecorded deed containing a mineral reservation may exist which 
pre-dates the adverse possession, and will result in mineral ownership
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contrary to that reflected by the record title.
2. Proving the contents o f a “lost deed.”
The claimant to a mineral reservation in a lost deed must prove its contents 
by clear, satisfactory and convincing proof. Witt v. Graves. 787 S.W.2d 
681 (Ark. 1990).
II. Severance of Title to the Minerals after the Surface Entry by the Adverse Possessor
A. Severance o f the mineral title by the fee owner.
The fee owner’s severance o f title to minerals after the surface entry by the adverse 
possessor does not interrupt the running o f the limitation period. The adverse 
possessor acquires title to the severed mineral estate. Broughton v. Humble Oil & 
R ef Co., 105 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
1. The rationale for the result.
“It is a general rule that once adverse possession has begun, that it may 
only be interrupted by an ouster, actual or constructive. An actual ouster 
would consist o f physical remover o f the AP from the premises, and a 
constructive ouster by the successful prosecution o f an action in ejectment 
to judgment. A conveyance or reservation o f the minerals, or the execution 
o f an oil and gas lease, does not constitute an ouster and, hence, will not 
interrupt possession.” Ates v. Yellow Pine Land Co., 310 So.2d 772, 775 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
2. The Arkansas authority, however slight, to the contrary.
A severed mineral interest survived plaintiffs acquisition o f title to wild 
and unimproved land by payment of taxes for 7 years under color of title 
pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-102. The mineral severance occurred 
after plaintiff commenced paying taxes under color o f title. Jones v.
Brown. 199 S.W.2d 973 (Ark. 1947). Compare Payne v. A M. Fruh Co.,
98 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1959).
B. Severance by adverse possessor.
1. Before the limitation period has run, the adverse possessor conveys all
minerals to a third party grantee. Adverse possessor remains in possession 
o f the surface. After the limitation period has run, the adverse possessor 
owns the surface and the third-party grantee owns the minerals. Clements
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v . Texas Co., 273 S.W. 993 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
“But a severance by one in possession, who has not yet matured a title, 
does not abandon, limit, or qualify his possession for the purpose o f 
ripening a title against the true owner out o f possession; and that, as 
against such disseized owner, the continued possession o f a trespasser after 
severance, as before, is adverse, and that such possession continued by 
either the trespasser or the third person to whom he severs will mature a 
limitation to the entire tract as against such disseized owner.” Id. at 1004- 
1005.
2. Before the limitation period has run, the adverse possessor conveys the 
land to a third party grantee and reserves all minerals. The third party 
grantee goes into surface possession and the periods o f occupation o f the 
two aggregate the limitation period. The third-party grantee owns the 
surface and the original adverse possessor owns the minerals. Houston Oil 
Co. v. Moss. 284 S.W.2d 131, 137.
“As against a third party, possession by either the grantor or grantee where 
severance is attempted by a trespasser should be regarded as possession of 
the entire premises for the benefit o f both, since collectively they are 
asserting a common title against the third party o f which he has adequate 
notice by the possession o f either. The result in this case is also desirable 
for policy reasons in that it will protect property owners, since in most 
cases it is the rightful owner who must rely upon the statute o f limitations 
to protect his title against the assertion o f old claims.” Id. At 137.
Compare Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Development 
Co., 131 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
3. Before the limitation period has run, the adverse possessor conveys one- 
half (1/2)  o f the minerals to a third party grantee. Adverse possessor 
remains in possession of the surface. After the limitation period has run, 
the adverse possessor owns the surface and one-half (1/2) o f the minerals 
and the third-party grantee owns the other one-half (1/2) o f the minerals. 
Smith v. Nyreen. 81 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1957).
Accord: Burbridge v. Rosen. 402 S.W.2d 502 (Ark. 1966) held that a 
claimant who paid taxes for 7 years to wild and unenclosed lands pursuant 
to Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-102 not only acquires title to the surface and 
non-severed mineral interests but also validates mineral reservations and 
conveyances that appear in his chain-of-title and occurred during the 
limitation period.
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The Court in Burbridge cited Clements v. Texas Co., supra and stated: “It 
is well settled that when a trespasser in actual adverse possession of 
property either conveys the land with a reservation o f a mineral interest or 
conveys a mineral interest itself, the continued possession by the surface 
claimant inures to the benefit o f the mineral interest as well.” Id. at 504.
III. Adverse Possession of Severed Mineral Interests by Working the Minerals.
A. “When a mineral ownership has been severed by deed from the surface ownership, 
as here, one cannot acquire title to the minerals by adverse possession unless he 
actually invades the minerals by opening mines or drilling wells and continues that 
action for the necessary statutory period.” Peterson v. Simpson. 690 S.W.2d 720 
(Ark. 1985).
B. The requisite production.
1. Fitful and desultory mining operations.
Casual mining every 3 or 4 months from surface outcrops during the 
limitation period amounted to only “fitful and desultory” occupancy for 
mining purposes, insufficient to adversely possess the severed mineral 
estate. No mines were opened or mining machinery installed on the land. 
There was not continuous mining occupancy o f any of the land for the 
limitation period. Clavbrooke v. Barnes, 22 S.W.2d 390 (Ark. 1929). 
Compare Thweatt v. Halmes, 580 S.W.2d 685 (Ark. 1979), wherein a 
severed coal interest was held to have been adversely possessed when 
mining occurred throughout the limitation period “when there was a 
market for the coal,” and, also, 15 shafts were sunk and coal for sale was 
advertised on the land and in a newspaper. But see the dissent by Justice 
Hickman.
2. Mineral extraction must infringe upon the severed mineral owner’s rights 
(or commercial production is required).
Taking gas from an off-tract abandoned well for use in connection with a 
chicken house and a domestic dwelling for the limitation period does not 
establish adverse possession o f a severed mineral interest. The gas was not 
sold and such use was not inconsistent with the severed mineral owner’s 
exploration and development right. Hassell v. Texaco. Inc., 372 P.2d 233 
(Okla. 1962).
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C. Effect of production from an off-tract unit well.
1. Production from an off-tract well does not mature limitation title to a 
mineral interest in a tract that has been committed by the adverse 
possession claimant to a voluntarily pooled unit. Brizzolara v. Powell. 218
S.W.2d 728 (Ark. 1949). An off-tract well is not notice o f production to 
the mineral owners o f other tracts located within the unit.
2. Production from an off-tract unit well on a drilling unit created by the 
Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, pursuant to the agency’s determination 
that the unit well would drain the unit lands, may mature limitation title to a 
mineral interest to a tract in a unit that the adverse possession claimant 
commits to the drilling o f the unit well. See, Brizzolara v. Powell. 218 
S.W.2d at 728. Contra Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Tomlinson. 859 P.2d 
1088 (Ok. 1993); Hunt Oil Co. v. Moore. 656 S.W.2d 634 (Tex Ct. App. 
1983); Dye v. Miller & Viele. 587 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978).
D. The extent o f the geographic area or the substance acquired.
1. Adverse possession o f oil or gas is limited to the oil or gas that is or will be 
produced by the then existing wells.
a. The limits to actual possession: the legacy of the hard mineral 
cases.
The adverse possessor only acquires rights to the coal loosened or 
actually mined.
"The owner o f the mine does not lose his rights as against the 
owner o f the surface by mere nonuser. His title can only be 
defeated by acts which actually take the mineral out o f his 
possession. In a very late case it is said that it is possible that 
adverse possession might be shown if a certain mine or quarry 
were surrounded on all sides with galleries and a defined area was 
so opened out. But, under ordinary circumstances, it is difficult to 
see how there can be adverse possession o f so much o f the mines or 
minerals as lie untouched in their bed." Pinev Oil & Gas Co. v.
Scott. 79 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Ky. 1935). See also, Sanford v. 
Alabama Power Co., 54 So.2d 562 (Ala. 1951).  French v. Lansing. 
132N.Y.S. 523 (N.Y. 1911).
For a criticism of this narrow view, see 1 Eugene Kuntz supra at 
§ 10.5.
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b. The geographic extent o f the adverse possessor’s claim is not
determined by the doctrine o f constructive possession based on his 
color o f title.
i. Some courts hold that the adverse possessor does not
acquire title to the produced mineral coextensive with the 
legal description contained in his color o f title instrument. 
See Pinev Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott. 79 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Ky. 
1935), wherein the Court observed: “A disseisor upon the 
surface may actually build upon, occupy, and use but a 
portion o f the territory embraced within his marked line or 
color, but he has an immediately potential use and 
occupancy o f the remainder o f his claim, and the law by 
construction extends his actual occupation over it, but, 
when he gets below the surface and attempts to take 
possession o f minerals, he can have no immediately 
potential use or occupation o f the whole of the minerals 
over which the law can by construction extend his actual 
possession; therefore he can have no possession o f the 
unmined portion.” Id. at 400.
ii. The better view.
Production for the limitations period from two wells in the 
comer of a 56 acre tract, under color of title, matured title 
to the oil interests, at least as to that production horizon, in 
the entire tract. Diederich v. Ware, 286 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 
App. 1956). The Court noted that the “subterranean 
structure” underlying the tract was changed as the fugacious 
minerals were produced by the wells. Thus, the adverse 
possession claimants exercised dominion over all o f the oil 
in the producing formation underlying the tract. Accord 
Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 141 N.E. 537 
(Ill. 1923).
iii. The Arkansas case.
Production o f oil from one tract within a lease does not 
constitute “constructive production” o f all o f the oil 
throughout the entire leasehold. Laney v. Monsanto 
Chemical Co., 348 S.W.2d 826 (Ark. 1961). Diederich is 
expressly disavowed. Id. at 827.
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Laney holds that a claimant paying taxes for 7 years under 
color of title pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-102, 
acquires title to a non-severed mineral interest even though 
the tract was subject to an oil and gas lease held by 
production from an off-tract lease well. Laney is premised 
on the rationale that the claimant, pursuant to the statute, 
has constructive possession o f the tract even though the 
non-severed mineral interest is subject to a producing oil 
and gas lease.
2. Adverse possession by production o f one substance does not mature 
limitation title to other substances claimed under color o f title.
a. The Arkansas case.
Production of gas for the limitation period under color o f title, a 
void mineral tax deed, did not acquire title by adverse possession to 
the coal. Hurst v. Rice. 643 S.W.2d 563 (Ark. 1982).
b. The better view.
Adverse possession by actually working one o f the minerals 
matures limitation title to other mineral substances coextensive with 
the scope of the claim of the color of title. 1 Eugene Kuntz supra 
at § 10.5.
E. Other significant adverse possession cases involving actual mining o f severed
mineral interests.
1. Production for the limitations period may allow acquisition by adverse 
possession o f the title to an oil and gas leasehold estate when the oil and 
gas lease has subsequently terminated. St. Louis Royalty Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 193 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1952).
2. A claimant to a working interest in the leasehold estate can acquire title by 
adverse possession, as against other claimants as to the working interest, 
through receipt for the limitation period o f revenues attributable to the 
working interest and payment of operating costs. Sun Operating Limited 
Partnership v. Oatman, 9 11 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1995).
3. Receipt o f excess royalty payments throughout the limitation period does 
not mature limitation title to the excess royalty interest. Palmer v. Lide.
567 S.W.2d 295 (Ark. 1978); Warmack v. Henry H. Cross Co., 377 
S.W.2d 47 (Ark. 1964).
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